tion that falls short of conceptual thought." 5 This view is comforting in that it accords a place for religion within the state, where representation and picture-thinking (as Vorstellung is sometimes translated) are adequate for the benighted citizenry incapable of speculative thinking. Religious thought again becomes a form of anthropological knowledge for the Scientiϐic community, which can now take religion as the object of study because systematic philosophy may recognize itself in this past form. 6 This "progressive" approach allows Hegel scholars to acknowledge the existence of religion in Hegel's thought, while relegating it to the status of error, i.e. an incomplete yet systematically necessary step in the path to the Truth, as found in the Absolute Knowing of Science. The ϐinal approach to the religion problem, of course, is simply to ignore chapter seven altogether, to leave it out. 7 Tom Rockmore perhaps best summarizes the general state of affairs when he writes, "One of the great, enduring mysteries of Hegel scholarship is the role of religion in his mature theory, including the Phenomenology." 8 Rockmore's diagnosis is particularly apt given what might be referred to as the current Anglo-American dominance in Hegel studies, when he further remarks that the "connection between religion and philosophy...never existed in the United States and was weaker in England than in continental Europe [and] has been appreciably weakened everywhere else in the philosophical world," with the possible exception of France. 9 Indeed, what Rockmore shows us is that the dismay and unease some commentators feel when arriving at chapter seven, on religion, in the Phenomenology of Spirit is the result of the disappearance, in our own time, of any pre-existing bond between religion and philosophy. This is signiϐicant because the explicit goal of Hegel's philosophy of religion is to strengthen and reinforce this very bond, which he already considers to be at risk. He clearly summarizes this project, at the end of his own lecture notes manuscript to the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, "Instead of allowing reason and religion to contradict themselves, we must resolve the discord in the manner appropriate to us -namely, reconciliation in the form of philosophy…. These lectures have attempted to offer guidance to this end. Religion must take refuge in philosophy." 10 The last sentence expresses the urgency Hegel perceives to his project, an urgency already anticipated in the writings of other authors from the late German Enlightenment, where the radical separation between faith and reason is felt as politically dangerous, particularly for the free pursuit of philosophical enquiry. 11 Our contemporary incapacity to conceive of the link between religion and philosophy or between faith and reason is symptomatic of a condition which Hegel himself viewed as a clear, contemporary malaise when he was pronouncing his courses on religion, in Berlin and which he makes explicit in his preface to H. F. W. Hinrichs' work on religion. 12 The pernicious theology of feeling that Hegel associates with Schleiermacher arises from the unreconciled dichotomy within the understanding (Verstand) itself, i.e., between inner intuition 10 G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen über die Religion, in Gesammelte Werke. Vorlesungen: Ausgewählte Nachscriften und Manuskripte, Bd. ͡, (ed.) W. Jaeschke (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, ͧͦ͟͡), ͧͤ, tr. by R. F. Brown, P. C. Hodgson, and J. M. Stewart, with assistance of H. S. Harris as Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion vol. ͡, (ed.) Peter Hodgson (Berkeley: University of California Press, ͧͦͣ͟), ͤ͟͟ ͤ͠. 11 See, for example, Kant's attempts to arbitrate between reason and faith in the Pantheismusstreit (i.e., the public epistolary debate between M. Mendelssohn and G. Jacobi) with his short essay "What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thought" (ͥͦͤ͟) (a.k.a. faith) and calculative reasoning (a.k.a. categorical judging). 13 Perhaps our own inability to come to terms with the philosophyreligion dichotomy reveals a postmodern condition that Hegel already foresaw, where we have come to be torn, as Peter Hodgson puts it, between "philosophical agnosticism and religious fundamentalism, the reigning dogmatisms of our time." 14 In his Preface to Hinrichs' work, Hegel laments the disjunctive tenor of his own times, in Berlin, in ͦ͟͠͞. It is no accident, for Hegel, that the terrorist murder of the Russian diplomat and playwright August Kotzebue (ͦͧ͟͟), which gave rise to the subsequent policies of state censorship and repression, was carried out by a fanatical theology student. As Kant had already foreseen, the radical separation between reason and faith could only bring about arbitrary, dangerous fanaticism and reactionary repression. 15 I believe that the problem posed by chapter seven, on religion, in the Phenomenology of Spirit, is indicative of a misunderstanding that goes to the very core of how we have tended to comprehend Hegel's systematic philosophy, namely our reluctance to consider the role of Revelation in Hegel's idea of Absolute Knowing and therefore, in his notion of Science. The misunderstanding thus also involves how other key expressions of systematicity in Hegel are understood: "Concept," "Spirit," and "Idea." Throughout all of these terms, Absolute Knowing is present, not just as our knowledge of a distinct, absolute substance or content but also and above all, as the subjective, knowing agency of the Absolute itself. The agency of the Absolute gives itself to be known and makes itself available to us, in religion (albeit in representational form), as Revelation. Religion, in Hegel, does not merely reveal the fact that the Absolute exists (i.e., the recognition of something inϐinite beyond us that religion "points to," as John Russon puts it, in the reference above) but the knowable content of what the Absolute is. As human knowledge, Absolute Knowing must recognize itself as participating in the self-knowing of 13 the Absolute itself. In other (Hegelian) words, Absolute Knowing is both content (substance) and form (subjectivity), and it is in such a subjectively substantive way that Hegel's expression, "The Absolute alone is true, or the truth alone is absolute," from the Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit 16 , can express anything other than an empty tautology. Without further muddying these already highly speculative waters, allow me to get away with simply stating, at this point, that the content/form of such knowledge is nothing other than freedom. Indeed, the highest expression of freedom is the revelatory agency of the Absolute, which is consequently an essential aspect of knowledge, of Absolute Knowing, and therefore of Hegelian Science.
What the above-mentioned contemporary accounts of religion in Hegel have in common, is that they reproduce the error that Hegel himself remarks on in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion; humanity has come to ignore the self-revelatory agency of God, and now understands religion exclusively in terms of human experience: "Taken with religious fervor, we tend to speak only of our relation to God…but a one-way relation is not one at all…God, in his perfect autonomy in-and-for-itself exists for the human spirit, communicates Himself to man…God exists and puts himself in relation to man." 17 The Absolute's revelatory agency grounds the possibility of Truth itself, to the extent that human knowing, the process that Hegel presents through his concepts of Reason and Spirit, must come to know itself as participating in the self-knowledge of the Absolute. Absolute self-knowledge is made possible through Revelation, an act that involves humanity in divine self-consciousness, where all that is known, and that which knows, are never merely human. Both currents anticipate the speculative reality of the Hegelian Idea and the philosophical enactment of its emanation (Revelation) and return (reason qua spirit) in the circular movement known as the Concept. Without Revelation, reason remains "human, all too human," essentially limited in its scope, an expression of freedom of the will, as we ϐind in Kant and Fichte, that must constantly position itself against nature. Conversely, however, without the activity of reason, from the perspective of human self-realization, Revelation remains the expression of authoritarian dogmatism. In other words, on its own, reason can do no better than Kantian (i.e. abstract) moral freedom, endlessly striving within and yet against a recalcitrant world, endlessly progressing towards a never attained supreme Good; and Revelation alone is experienced as form of heteronomous necessity, of "positivity," to use the word of the time. Thus, to take the reconciliation between reason and Revelation a step further, on a path that I will return to further on, Hegel's systematic project can be seen as bringing together freedom and necessity, in the organic, universal singularity that is Science, where the Absolute Idea presents itself as true, good and, perhaps above all, beautiful, following Kant's deϐinition of beauty as a singular work conjoining freedom and necessity. 20 If we accept the dual agency of reason and Revelation in Hegel's theory of Absolute Knowledge, then we might well wonder how the content of Revelation takes place in the world. Above, I asserted that such content was essentially freedom. If that is the case, then surely the path of human reason that Hegel lays out in the Phenomenology and in his Spirit is explicitly presented as the story of human freedom, through the progressive history of states and their constitutions, should immediately be the terrain where we also ϐind the agency of Revelation. In other words, human political (in the broadest sense) actuality (Wirklichkeit) should enact the immediate coincidence of human reason and divine or absolute Revelation. The communal path of human consciousness, the story of what Hegel calls Spirit should also be where the agency of Revelation plays itself out. History should be providential. This is Emil Fackenheim's conclusion, which I would like to now examine and challenge. In doing so, I want to establish the absolute limits of what Hegel calls actuality, the worldly instantiations of human reason and its aspirations. My challenge has repercussions beyond Fackenheim, on other (Left) Hegelian readings as well, i.e., on those who evaluate his philosophy against the failings of the real world, failings which, I maintain, Hegel readily recognizes in his deϐinition of reason-based actuality.
Emil Fackenheim, in his book, The Religious Dimension of Hegel's Thought, certainly recognizes the essential complicity of Revelation in Hegel, which he describes as the "overreaching [i.e. agency] of the Idea" into the world. For Fackenheim, the Idea/God's revelatory agency combines with the contrasting "over-reaching" agency, that of Spirit (human reason) in order to establish what he refers to as the Hegelian middle, which takes place as worldly actuality. "Hegel's life-long endeavour was to ϐind the Absolute not beyond but present in the world," he writes. 21 The human world is the meaningful result of the conϐluence between reason and Revelation. In Fackenheim's words, our world is thus "doubly overreached": "This modern world, then, already is doubly overreached, by a creating, preserving, and redeeming God and by a Spirit which, manifest in man, accepts itself as created, preserved and redeemed." 22 The worldly truth of this middle is for Hegel, according to Fackenheim, incarnate in the actuality of the bourgeois Christian world. Since this middle, as actuality, is the locus where the entire system's realization or Truth takes place, and upon which its success depends, the failure of bourgeois Christian actuality, in ͠͞ th -century totalitarian horrors and particularly those of the Holocaust, must therefore also mean the failure of the whole Hegelian enterprise. According to Fackenheim's theodicy of Hegel, the political failure of the actual world refutes the system. 23 I am recognizing Fackenheim's noted complicity between reason and Revelation as integral to Hegelian systematicity. However, whereas he sees the two as working together throughout the system to produce Truth in the form of actuality, I am claiming that the revelatory agency of the Absolute is speciϐically carried out in the "absolute" elements of Hegel's philosophy, in the manifestations of Absolute Spirit: in art, religion and philosophy, and in the subjective side of Hegel's Logics 24 , i.e., in the "Logic of the Concept," and perhaps, although I offer the idea only as a hypothesis, in the appearance of organic life in the Philosophy of Nature. Conversely, the agency of human reason has its own place in the system, notably in the ϐirst six chapters of the Phenomenology of Spirit, in the Subjective and Objective Spirit sections of the Encyclopaedia's Philosophy of Spirit and in the Objective Logic part of the Science of Logic (I have provided a schema, below, that hopefully makes this extensive list of references easier to envision). My contention is that the Absolute is never realized in worldly actuality per se, but rather in the systematic embrace of Science itself, which is expressed as Absolute Knowing (in the Phenomenology), in the Absolute Idea (in the Logics) and in Absolute Spirit (in the Philosophy of Spirit) and perhaps with the appearance of organic life in the Philosophy of Nature. Consequently, far from constituting the essential Hegelian middle, as Fackenheim calls it, actuality is the highest but necessarily ϐlawed iteration of (human) reason. As such, it is essentially limited, endlessly limited and onto-logically incapable, on its own, of embodying Truth in the full Hegelian sense of the word.
Schema: Reason and Revelation in Hegel's Main Works

Phenomenology of Spirit
Actuality, within the Hegelian oeuvre, always appears in contexts where the Truth is anticipated but never realized: this is how the category of "Actuality" occurs in the ϐinal subchapter of Objective Logic, in the Science of Logic, just before the Logic of the Concept (Subjective Logic), and how it is found in moral striving, at the end of the Phenomenology's chapter six (subchapter on "Morality"), just before Religion, and again as the inϐinite, always unrealized progress of political freedom in state constitutions and world history, at the end of the Encyclopaedia's philosophy of Objective Spirit, just before we move onto the forms of Absolute Spirit articulated in art, religion and philosophy. In each case, human reason ends in the neverending limitations of actuality. Nonetheless, and it is crucial to note, the fact that human reason persists, in spite of its failures, already attests to a content beyond that of reason itself, a content that is the proffered, self-posited substance of the Absolute, which is experienced, in religious terms, as Revelation.
Let us return brieϐly to the reciprocal and yet distinct agencies of reason and Revelation in the Phenomenology. We are generally familiar with the account of the progress of reason in this work: from consciousness, through self-consciousness, to Reason itself in chapter ϐive, and ϐinally in Spirit (chapter six), we trace the movement of free human selϐhood as it comes to know itself in everricher, freer, more self-imbued forms of objectivity. From the Enlightenment individual's certainty of ϐinding itself, qua reason, in all of reality (chapter ϐive), we come to recognize the historical truth of this realization as humanity's self-reϐlection in world-historical spirit, in chapter six. But this is where I believe the journey of reason alone meets its limits: in the endless striving postulated by Kantian morality, towards a cosmopolitan community of the summum bonum that it can never actually reach. Reason ends in the endless approximations of human, moral actuality. 25 The story of reason ends, however, where the story of Revelation begins, in chapter seven on Religion. It is only through the narrative "rounding out" provided by Revelation that there is anything to morally strive for: true freedom, instantiated in nature rather than struggling against it, the realized aim of Kant's categorical imperative, posited not in the world of actuality but rather in the "worlds" of art, religion and philosophy.
Having looked, brieϐly, at the story of reason in the Phenomenology, let us look, again brieϐly, at the story of Revelation as told in chapter seven of the Phenomenology and ϐleshed out in the Lectures on the Philosophies of Art and Religion. The Absolute (the Idea/God/Light) ϐirst reveals itself to us as incarnated in individual, natural objects, i.e. where this tree, this stream, this rock may be "illuminated" as sacred or godly. The multiplicity of individual objects betrays the impossibility of the Universal fully inhabiting any one of them. Their bad inϐinity collapses into an empty universality, a kind of acosmic pantheism where anything in nature may indifferently be taken as holy. Next, the sacred is embodied in the quasihuman art forms of man-made Greco-Roman sculpture, in the syllogistic moment of particularity, where each human-like and yet lifeless stone god represents a particular power: the sea, the hunt, wisdom, war, etc.
Finally, the absolute comes to inhabit or incarnate the ultimate "art object," the perfect individual form that is both divine and natural, human and godly, dead and alive, and above all, beautiful: the individuality of Christ. Christ himself, i.e., the son of God who is God, 25 While there is a tendency on the part of commentators, as I wrote above, to stress the moral community, at the end of chapter six, thus rendering questionable the importance of chapter seven (Religion), the Morality section remains shot through with dialectical iterations of good and bad, confession and absolution, in what Jay Lampert, at a recent meeting of the Ontario-Quebec Hegel Organization (ͤ͟͠͞) described, extemporaneously, as "a morass of mutual contempt." In any case, whether we subscribe to the idea that the Morality section replays the contradictions of ironic Romanticism (evoking ϐigures of Fr. Schlegel, Novalis and Hölderlin) or the articulations of Kantian/Fichtean morality, there is no reason to establish a deϐinitive ending in chapter six. Otherwise, once again, why add chapters seven and eight?
can be seen as the last "art object," the truly universal singular, the beautiful union of absolute form and content. Christ marks, for Hegel, the end of art, the end of the Ancient world, and the beginning of religion per se, i.e., the modern era and the truth that the Absolute cannot be contained in any single, natural or man-made being. The human body of Christ is ripped apart from within, we might say, by its own universality. God is dead, as Hegel puts it, not so much because he is cruciϐied but because his ϐinite body cannot contain the inϐinite universal. 26 Revealed (Offenbare, which has a more active sense than "revealed") religion presents a new form of Revelation, where the Absolute comes to inhabit sacred words in the texts of religious doctrine. 27 The stories of reason and Revelation, which I have just outlined, are, of course, interrelated. In the Phenomenology, human spirit rises (and the story of reason begins) as the tragic, unhappy quest to reenact the lost instance of God in the World. The re-enactment of this condition is indeed the goal of reason and actuality. However, actuality, as such, must fail, a failure that is endlessly renewed and reiterated, as we ϐind in the Phenomenology, at the end of chapter six. For the Absolute to again take place in the world, we must bracket reason, as the human, all too human quest to regain the lost, punctual unity of the Christly individuality, and look to the more spiritual, less immediately natural instances of Revelation that we ϐind in the Religion chapter. Absolute Knowing, the short ϐinal chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit recognizes the complicity of human spirit and Revelation, the fact that they are both aspects of the Concept, the truth that, as I quoted above, "the self-consciousness of God…knows itself in human knowledge." Absolute Knowing is not humanly possible without the Absolute having given itself to be known. However, as we know from his dialectical logic generally, the Hegelian unity between reason and Revelation can only happen if we ϐirst acknowledge and celebrate their difference, within the system itself. 26 Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, ͣͥ͢/Phenomenology of Spirit, §ͥͣ͠. 27 Hegel refers to the religious community celebrating "content in the form of picture-thinking [Vorstellens] ." I believe such "representing" is essentially linguistic and different from the Darstellen [presenting] that characterizes art. The translation of Vorstellung as picture-thinking misses the crucial difference between it and the artistic instantiations of Revelation in singular sacred objections. The doctrinal language of Revelation is further spiritualized, further reϐlected upon and thus, re-presented as a communal ritual. Hegel probably had in mind such doctrinal language as the Nicene Creed, which afϐirms the Trinity, as well as he divinity of Christ.
The Phenomenology's Absolute Knowing chapter preϐigures what Hegel refers to as Science, systematic philosophy as expressed in his Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences and taught in the modern state university (of which the University of Berlin provided the model), comprising the Logic, the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Spirit, whose ϐinal chapter, Absolute Spirit, presents the revelatory expressions of art, religion and philosophy. If the Absolute and the human are to be again one in the world, it is in those forms where human reason and Revelation are one. Human actuality, on its own, strives for but never achieves such unity. On the other hand, to actually be, Revelation must also take place in the world; and if we look at the worldly forms that Revelation does take, we notice that they themselves adopt forms that are increasingly human. Referring again to the Religion chapter in the Phenomenology, we see how the fetishistic religions of nature, where any natural object may be sacred, give way to the human/divine presentations of Greco-Roman gods, sculpted by human artists, and then to the last Ancient "art form," the human God himself, where the human and the divine meet in a singular, living moment. Revealed religion, the second Hegelian form of Absolute Spirit, following art, continues the narrative. However, here, the cohabitation of the human and the divine goes beyond the singular form of the art object, to embrace the sacred in a form that involves an essential aspect of humanity: the intersubjective, linguistic reality of human community, which now takes place, in Hegel's terms, in the communal worship and consecration of revelatory church doctrine (Lehre = teachings). In this shared, free celebration of doctrine, church dogma loses its "dogmatic," positive, imposed aspect. In fact, as is the case with the other expressions of Absolute Spirit (art and philosophy) religious worship brings together human freedom (worship) and revelatory necessity (dogma) in a concrete form that replays the Kantian ideal of the beautiful, which Hegel presents as the cohabitation of the human and the divine.
Indeed, building on the aesthetic reference, we can trace the destiny of the empty temples that Hegel evokes in chapter seven of the Phenomenology, following the shocking afϐirmation that "God [as Christ] is dead," back to the discussion on architecture as geometrical space inhabited by stone statues of the gods, in the Lectures on the Philosophy of Art. 28 It is these empty "temples" that are now, in revealed religion, ϐilled with human worshippers freely consecrating the given words of doctrine. 29 I believe we can follow the trajectory of the architectural "temple" even further, beyond its religious determination, to where it becomes the highest space of Hegelian "worship," that which takes place in the shared discourse of systematic, philosophical Science, at the state university. The vocation of philosophical Science, as the ultimate form of Absolute spirit, is not to abandon the earlier content of Revelation (art and religion) but to grasp its speculative nature and thus conserve it as aufgehoben. This means acknowledging the histories of Revelation as philosophically meaningful, precisely the project that Hegel carries out in his copious lectures on the philosophies of art and religion. 30 Consequently, Hegel's philosophy of religion, as the philosophical interpretation of Revelation, and ultimately, of church doctrine 31 , brings a new, fully human form to the Absolute's agency, a worldly place (of "worship") where human reason and divine Revelation are again at home together, in the communal celebration of Absolute knowing. The empty temples are "ful-ϐilled" in the state university, the worldly embodiment, the "temple" of Hegelian Science. It is here that the content of both reason (the human history of Spirit, including the imperfect pursuits of history and politics) and Revelation (Absolute spirit: the philosophical histories of art, religion and philosophy) are taught together in their Encyclopaedic form. The state university is, for Hegel, where the re-Incarnation truly takes place, as a mediated, singular form that acknowledges the complicit agency of the human and the Absolute. As such, the state university enjoys an ontological status that participates in actuality (as the expression of human freedom) while recognizing the metaphysical source of that freedom in the Idea. 29 This is why Schleiermacher's religion of feeling represents such an existential threat for Hegel: for Schleiemacher, doctrine is no more than, "a mausoleum of religion," as he writes in the second of his Speeches on Religion, a testimony to an absolute absence. Thus, the words in which Revelation takes place are desacralized, evacuated of their divine content. 30 In becoming historical, Revelation participates in human time, in the human narrative. Otherwise, the Truth of Revelation is eternally "now" and present. The reconciliation between reason and Revelation, in Hegel, thus uniϐies the two apparently divergent temporal backgrounds for Truth: the Ancient, Aristotelian idea of Truth as eternal is brought together with the modern, Christian, historical story of Truth, resolving the fundamentally tragic dichotomy that Karl Löwith ascribes to Hegel (and his successors) in his, From Hegel to Nietzsche. 31 As I mentioned above, Hegel generally refers to church doctrine in terms of Vorstellung (representation).
Saying that the university is, for Hegel, the place where reason and Revelation are at home (bei sich) together in Science, requires comprehending their relation in terms of how he presents the process of "knowing" (Erkennen) generally: as a process of selfrecognition in otherness. Knowing, in this sense, always involves "recognition," a fact obscured by the habitual translation of Erkennen as "cognition." For Hegel, to know something is to know oneself in it and to know oneself (the goal of philosophy) is to also recognize the "otherness" in oneself. In the sphere of Absolute Knowing, reason has come to recognize itself (to know itself) in the absolute otherness of the Absolute's own self-recognition/self-revelation. In Science, therefore Erkennen becomes Wissen, a category of knowledge akin to wisdom, in the form of Wissenschaft (Science). The process of knowing (Erkennen) as mutual recognition is what Hegel recounts in the Phenomenology, where the narratives of reason are rounded out by those of Revelation, in religion.
Therefore, the stuff of Revelation is not to be found immediately in human actuality generally, and this is again Fackenheim's problem, to the extent that he presents Hegelian "actuality" (Wirklichkeit) as the immediate "synthesis" between the divine and the worldly, which he calls the Hegelian middle. As I have been arguing, Revelation does, of course, embrace the human, through the histories of art, religion and philosophy, but it does so because its agency is "ϐirst of all" distinct from that of human reason.
Divorced from the agency of Revelation, reason must end in the logic of actuality. This is the same logic that informs the endless strivings of "Morality" and which prevents Hegel, at the end of Objective Spirit (a.k.a. the political Philosophy of Right) from subscribing to a cosmopolitan political vision of the happy end of history where freedom is fully realized in a global state constitution. Just as there will never be a terrestrial summum bonum (supreme good, heaven on earth), there will never be a perfectly harmonious instantiation of the perfect political constitution. Humanity is just too human. Actuality is just too… actual. Of course, that does not prevent Hegel from dealing with the failing features of actuality, qua reason, Scientiϐical-ly, which he begins doing by examining the category itself, in his Logics.
Consequently, in order to comprehend the onto-logical failings of actuality, according to Hegel's Science, we must turn, at least brieϐly, to how the category itself appears in Hegel's Logics, where it is presented on its own, as distinct from the agency of the Absolute. The ϐlawed ontological nature of actuality has profound repercussions on how Hegel is read and interpreted, not only for those, like Fackenheim, who see it as the sole theatre of the divine, but for all of those Hegelians who refuse the divine entirely and are forced to place all their dialectical hopes (and disappointments) in the successes or failures of the actual world.
Clearly stated, the accounts of those who judge the philosopher's contemporary relevance on the basis of whether the "actual" world lives up to or even contradicts the absolute demands of his system should be confronted with Hegel's own recognition of the endless limitations of actuality itself. This is especially pertinent because Hegel is arguably the only important modern philosopher whose thought is continually questioned on the basis of its relation to the "real world," by critics on the Left (e.g. Marx and Engels) or on the Right (e.g. Fackenheim) of the Hegelian spectrum of interpretation. 32 Those on the Right, who accept the agency of the Absolute, the Idea or God and acknowledge the systematic pretentions of their philosopher may be disheartened by the horrible excesses of atheistic, materialistic, totalitarian etc. actuality. Conversely, those on the Left, like Frederick Beiser, feel that ironic, atheistic contemporary actuality has rendered null any systematic, absolute pretentions Hegel might have had. 33 However, in recognizing where actuality actually stands in Hegel's thought, we are able to recognize where the true "Hegelian middle" is really to be found: in the expressions of art, religion and philosophy, where the revelatory agency of the Absolute comes together with the aspirations of human reason. Once again, the endless limitations of actuality are only Scientiϐically appreciated if we recognize the dialectical difference at play between the agencies of reason and Revelation.
The difference between the activity of reason and that of Revelation (and thus the possibility of their speculative reconciliation) is 32 In spite of Heidegger's Nazi failings, his philosophy is rarely, if ever, evaluated against contemporary actuality, other than in a positive light, as with his naturalist writings on technology. 33 See the Introduction to Beiser's After Hegel: German Philosophy Between ͣͪͦ͢ and ͣͫ͢͢ (Princeton: Princeton University Press, ͟͢͠͞) where he argues that the second half of the ͧ͟ th century is more philosophically interesting than the ϐirst because its avowed materialistic secularism has gotten over questions of religious faith in its relation to reason. I would argue that given the current tenor of the times, and the reigning "dogmatisms" that Peter Hodgson refers to as, "philosophical agnosticism and religious fundamentalism," the questions dealt with in the late ͦ͟ th and early ͧ͟ th centuries, regarding faith and reason, are more philosophically germane than ever! In any case, the "modern movement toward secularization" (ͣ) that Beiser mentions certainly seems either to have stalled or to be running backwards, except, perhaps in philosophical academe.
fundamental to Hegel's Logics and explains the often over-looked binary distinction that underlies his Science of Logic: the distinction between Objective Logic (the Doctrines of Being and Essence) and Subjective Logic (Doctrine of the Concept). As is the case at the end of the Phenomenology's sixth chapter (with the moral community), the end of the Objective Logic appears to leave us within the comforting embrace of a meaningful reality, which is explicitly presented as Wirklichkeit (Actuality). Just as we may ask ourselves, in the Phenomenology, why we must leave the communal "being at home in otherness," in the Spirit chapter, and plunge into the apparently unreasonable obscurity of religion, similarly, in the Logics, we are reluctant to leave the meaningful reality of "Actuality" for the apparently abstract forms of judgement and syllogism that we discover in the Doctrine of the Concept. If the binary distinction between Objective and Subjective Logics is just as puzzling to Hegelian Trinitarians as is the break between chapters six and seven in the Phenomenology or perhaps the move from Objective Spirit (the state and world history) to Absolute Spirit in the Encyclopaedia's Philosophy of Spirit, it is because the Logics present the fundamental distinction between two points of view or rather two different narratives, each with its own protagonist. Actuality represents the limits of the human story, and an opening onto a new perspective.
In the Logics, Wirklichkeit is presented as shot through with bad inϐinity and endless regression. In causality, for example, the relation between cause and effect produces a "progress in ϔinitum," 34 an inϐinite, meaningless chain of efϐicient causation where each becomes the other endlessly. The lack of any ϐirst/ϐinal cause is precisely what distinguishes his own take on actuality, Hegel acknowledges, from Aristotle's promotion of the same category as actus. (EL, §͟͢͠Z) 35 The same logic of endless, efϐicient reϐlection is played out in the other reciprocal, oscillatory relationships explored in the ontological categories of the "Actuality" section: between substantiality and accident, and again in the modal character that runs 35 In the Encyclopaedia Logic, §͟͢͠Z, Hegel remarks that Aristotle's view of "actuality" is the "principle of philosophy"; Aristotle's "actuality is that of the Idea itself and not ordinary actuality of what is immediately present." through the section, for example, in the continual interplay between conditions, necessity, possibility and contingency, and more fundamentally, between identity and difference. 36 The dizzying dance of Actuality's relational and modal ontological categories allows Hegel, in the Additions to the Encyclopaedia Logic, to refer repeatedly to instances of human existence that are endlessly recalcitrant to deϐinitive realizations: to "constitutions and laws" (EL, §ͣͤ͟Z), to "systems of taxation" (EL, §͟͢͠Z), or to the contingencies of language, "law, art etc." (EL, §ͣ͟͢Z); "the Sultan and the Pope" (EL, §͟͢͡Z) are even mentioned. Hegel's examples are signiϐi-cant in their familiar banality. They are expressions of human reason (laws, taxation, language, modern artistic expressions) that we recognize as caught up in the bad inϐinity of contingent reality, and which characterizes our everyday lives: the meaningful, meaningless actuality of our world.
The Objective Logic (Doctrines of Being and Essence) recounts the path of reason in its thoughtful determinations of objectivity, which, from the initial point of empty being, become increasingly essential or meaningful. The goal of the Logics, in my view, is the ontological determination of scientiϐically signiϐicant being qua nature, the object of the natural sciences and the theme of the subsequent tome of the Encyclopaedia: the Philosophy of Nature. However, the path of determinant being stalls at "Actuality," where, as we saw, being gets caught up in the endless regressions of causality, subject and accident, and modal contingency. The holistic rounding out, the completion of the Logics' narrative, i.e. the full determining of being as existing, knowable nature, for Science, is only made possible through the agency of the Absolute, an expression of Revelation that takes place in the second half of the Logics, in the Doctrine of the Concept. Here, the determination of nature takes on its holistic, uniϐied, purposive quality, without which, as Kant had seen in his Critique of Judgement, we cannot do natural science. The holistic, organic aspect of nature cannot be derived from human reason alone but must be "supplied" by the agency of the Absolute qua Revelation, where being is determined as One and whole. Only then can we fully grasp the sense of the famous, much discussed ending of the Logics, where the Idea (God) freely de-syllogises itself (sich entschliesst), discloses itself as nature. In a word, in order for nature to constitute a purposive whole, and thus be the object of knowledge in the subse-quent Philosophy of Nature, it must be presented as the proffered content of the Idea. In the Doctrine of the Concept, being becomes the revelatory Word or logos of the Idea's posited selϐhood, articulated through the ontological grammar of judgment and syllogism, the two main sections of the Subjective Logic (Logic of the Concept).
Actuality, which closes Objective Logic, is the highest determination of objectivity that human reason, left on its own, is capable of. Actuality is certainly more meaningful than the emptiness with which the Logics' narrative begins; actuality is the locus of human political history, human morality, and even the human, all too human re-iterations of modern, romantic art, of biblical hermeneutics and ironic, un-systematic philosophizing. Indeed, if these worldly, contemporary pursuits strike us, still today, as recognizable, it is because they are logically never-ending. The endlessly tragi-comic play of demise, renewal and demise, in all human pursuits, the nauseating "slaughter bench" that Hegel refers to in the Introduction to his Lectures on the Philosophy of History, and which we still see around us today, is what justiϐies the negative theodicy of Hegelian philosophy, shared by commentators on both the Right and the Left of the interpretive spectrum. My point is that it is wrong to unduly promote the category of actuality in Hegel, and then to judge his philosophy with respect to how that category compares to the "real world." For him, actuality itself and the strivings of the human world must always disappoint and scandalize us; the actual world can never live up to the beautiful reconciliations of the human and the divine that are incarnate in art and religion, and realized in philosophical Science. Actuality alone must always fail and yet "always failing" already implies a constantly renewed effort, an endless striving for something that only revelation can offer, namely the ideas of the good, the true and the beautiful, i.e. the dynamic unity of freedom and necessity that Hegel presents as the Absolute Idea, with which the Logics end.
Actuality can only posit the unity of freedom and necessity as a summum bonum and constantly strive toward it without ever attaining it. What is missing is the subjective agency of the Idea/god. The binary division we ϐind in the Science of Logic, between Objective and Subjective Logics, clearly establishes the distinction between the human and the divine, a distinction necessary in order for their reconciliation to take place in philosophical Science. For Hegel, the state university is the reincarnated beautiful individuality where human reason (the Faculties of Law and Medicine) and divine Revelation (the Faculty of Theology) are truly reconciled in a universal singularity (the Faculty of Philosophy). It is an existing state institu-tion where human knowledge is freely carried out along with the realization that "what is to be known," the revealed content of knowledge, is necessarily much more than human.
Many of today's jaded professors, together with business people, journalists, politicians, disenchanted students, and their parents, would certainly ϐind such a promotion of the public (state) university bewildering, perhaps especially in the United States where private universities thrive. It is indeed difϐicult for us, today, to imagine the ontological status that the founders of the University of Berlin, all philosophers (Fichte, Humbolt, Schleiermacher and, later, Hegel), invested in that pioneering state institution, and how its mission necessarily involved coming to terms with the Auϔklärung's fundamental conϐlict between faith and knowledge, exempliϐied in the Pantheismusstreit between Jacobi and Mendelssohn, and which Kant had already unsuccessfully attempted to resolve at the university level in his essay on the "Conϐlict of the Faculties." Of course, as a state institution, the university is de facto political, and actual to the extent that it is in the world. However, I believe it is fair to say that, for Hegel, the actuality of the state university is truly, "[the actuality] of the Idea itself and not [the] ordinary actuality of what is simply present." (EL, §͟͢͠Z, where Hegel refers to Aristotle)
The difϐiculty that we have in recognizing the absolute ontological status of the state university perhaps lies, once again, with us. Because we no longer ascribe agency to the Idea (to God, to the Absolute), we remain stuck at the "end of chapter six," caught up in the endless endings of human actuality, where the university project is nothing special and certainly not the unique realization of logos, the discursive reality where both Revelation and reason are at home (bei sich).
Have we responded to the qualms referred to at the beginning of this article, regarding the religious dimension of Hegel's thought? Perhaps, it might be objected that in seeking to recognize the religious dimension, I have, in fact, denied it. Indeed, if Science allows us to understand Revelation as the agency of the Absolute or the selfconsciousness of the Idea, do we really need religion? May we not now jump straight to chapter eight, on Absolute Knowing, the very move that I have been arguing against through my discussion of Revelation? Of course, while such an omission has always been possible, I hope to have shown that it would be deeply unfaithful to Hegel's thought. To know the Truth of the Absolute is to recognize its agency and this is only possible if we not only recognize that the Absolute exists but how It has given itself to be known in the religious forms of Revelation. 37 This knowledge takes place in those increasingly human forms of the sacred, celebrated in communal forms of religious worship and study. It is in these absolute forms of actuality that Truth as self-knowledge is carried out, thereby making knowledge itself possible. 38 jreid@uottawa.ca
